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Abstract—Federated learning is a recently proposed paradigm that
enables multiple clients to collaboratively train a joint model. It
allows clients to train models locally, and leverages the parameter
server to generate a global model by aggregating the locally submitted
gradient updates at each round. Although the incentive model for
federated learning has not been fully developed, it is supposed that
participants are able to get rewards or the privilege to use the final
global model, as a compensation for taking efforts to train the model.
Therefore, a client who does not have any local data has the incentive
to construct local gradient updates in order to deceive for rewards.
In this paper, we are the first to propose the notion of free rider
attacks, to explore possible ways that an attacker may construct
gradient updates, without any local training data. Furthermore, we
explore possible defenses that could detect the proposed attacks,
and propose a new high dimensional detection method called STD-
DAGMM, which particularly works well for anomaly detection of
model parameters. We extend the attacks and defenses to consider
more free riders as well as differential privacy, which sheds light on
and calls for future research in this field.
Keywords—anomaly detection, federated learning, free-rider de-
tection, machine learning security.
I. INTRODUCTION
FEDERATED learning [1], [2], [3] has been proposedto facilitate a joint model training leveraging data from
multiple clients, where the training process is coordinated
by a parameter server. In the whole process, clients’ data
stay local, and only model parameters are communicated
among clients through the parameter server. A typical training
iteration works as follows. First, the parameter server sends
the newest global model to each client. Then, each client
locally updates the model using local data and reports updated
gradients to the parameter server. Finally, the server performs
model aggregation on all submitted local updates to form a
new global model, which has better performance than models
trained using any single client’s data.
Compared with an alternative approach which simply col-
lects all data from the clients and trains a model on those
data, federated learning is able to save the communication
overhead by only transmitting model parameters, as well as
protect privacy since all data stay local. As a result, federated
learning has attracted much attention and is being widely
adopted for model training utilizing data from multiple users
and/or organizations.
Federated learning has many practical applications, such as
next-word prediction in a virtual keyboard for smartphones [4],
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prediction of customers’ usage of IoT devices [5] and classi-
fication of hospitalizations for cardiac events [6], to achieve a
well-trained model. Although the profit model [7] for federated
learning has not been fully developed, one would assume that
a client who contributes data to the model training process
could either get money or the privilege to use the final trained
model as a reward. However, a question raised by this is: how
could one tell whether the model updates uploaded by a client
are actually trained using local data, or artificially constructed
weights which adds no value to the model?
Free-riders are generally referred as some individuals who
benefit from resources, public goods, or services of a commu-
nal nature, but do not pay for them [8]. The free-riders problem
has been extensively studied in peer-to-peer systems [9], [10],
[11]. The aim of this paper is to set out the research of free-
riders in federated learning. In a federated learning setting
where each contributing client could get a reward, there may
exist clients that pretend to be contributing to trick rewards.
We refer such clients as free-riders, and the procedure of
generating fake weights to report to the parameter server as
free-rider attacks. There could be two main incentives for free
riders to submit fake updates. For one, a client may not have
the required data, or is concerned about data privacy, so that
local data are not available for model training. For another, a
client may want to save local CPU cycles or other computing
resources. Note that in the first case, where local data are
not available but a client is willing to consume computing
resources, the client may try to submit gradients trained with
another dataset in order to evade detection. However, the cen-
tral server could easily catch such a free rider by verifying the
model accuracy on a holdout validation dataset. Thus, in both
cases, free riders will have to fake their weight submissions,
through clever manipulations of the information provided by
the central server. With that, we explore a set of free-rider
attacks and propose a powerful defense mechanism - STD-
DAGMM, that is able to detect most free riders and prevent
them from getting the final model and monetary rewards. We
leave it as an open question to explore more sophisticated
attacks and defences.
We start from a simple attack where the free-rider simply
uses randomly generated values as the gradient updates. We
empirically show that this attack can evade a popular detection
approach, i.e., Autoencoder [12], [13], but be detected by a
recently proposed high-dimensional anomaly detection method
- DAGMM [14]. Then, we propose a new attack named delta
weights attack, which generates gradient updates by subtract-
ing the two global models received in previous two rounds. We
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show that such an attack is able to evade DAGMM detection.
To defend against such attacks, we propose a STD-DAGMM,
which incorporates the standard deviation metric of a local
gradient update matrix with DAGMM. We extensively evaluate
STD-DAGMM under stronger attacks and with varying real-
world settings. We believe our findings could be inspiring for
the research in federated learning, and initiates a new field of
free rider detection in such an environment. Our contributions
are summarized as follows.
1) As far as we know, we are the first to explore free-
rider attacks in federated learning, and propose possible
defenses against such attacks.
2) We explore the best attack a free rider may exploit,
and propose a novel high-dimensional anomaly detection
approach, STD-DAGMM, that is particularly useful for
free rider detection. The proposed method is potentially
useful for other model weights anomaly detection as
well.
3) We extend our findings under more real world settings,
such as in the face of differential privacy. We observe
that differential privacy in federated learning could
potentially mitigate the effectiveness of the proposed
attacks and make them more easily to be detected.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Federated learning
In a typical federated learning setting, a central parameter
server coordinates a network of nodes, e.g. smartphones,
tablets and laptops, to train a global model utilizing data from
all the participants. Suppose there are n clients C1, C2, ...,
Cn collaboratively training a global model M in the setting of
federated learning. In the j-th round, each client Ci receives
the newest global model Mj from the parameter server, and
produces local gradient Gi,j by training the model using its
local data; the parameter server aggregates each Gi,j to be a
new global model, using [1]
Mj+1 =Mj − η · 1
n
n∑
i=1
Gi,j (1)
where η is a global learning rate applied by the parameter
server, to control learning speed etc. In a simple case, η = 1,
where for each round, a new global model is generated by
simply subtracting the average of all local gradient updates
from the previous global model.
B. DAGMM
DAGMM [14], short for Deep Autoencoding Gaussian
Mixture Model, uses a deep Autoencoder to generate a low-
dimensional representation, as well as calculate the reconstruc-
tion error for each input data point. It further concatenates the
low-dimensional embedding with the distances between input
and reconstructed output by Autoencoder, including Euclidean
distance and Cosine distance. The concatenated vector is fed
into a Gaussian mixture model (GMM), which adopts an
estimation network and trains the parameters to make the input
fit the Gaussian mixture model. DAGMM jointly optimizes the
parameters for deep Autoencoder and the Gaussian mixture
model in an end-to-end fashion, with the goal of minimizing
Autoencoder input-output error and fitting the GMM model
in the same time. According to [14], the end-to-end training
is beneficial to density estimation, since we can have more
freedom to adjust the dimension of encoded vector to favor
the subsequent density estimation tasks. To perform anomaly
detection, DAGMM takes mini batches of high dimensional
vectors as an inputs, trains to optimize the model parameters,
and finally outputs an energy value for each vector. The vectors
having energy values higher than the majority are considered
as suspicious.
III. PROBLEM SETTING
For federated learning, we adopt the notions and symbols
presented in Section II-A. In the j-th round, a client Ci
receives a global model Mj , and submits a gradient update
Gi,j .
a) Free-riders.: We define a free-rider as a client (say
Ci) who fakes Gi,j and pretends it to be generated through
local data training. Ci may not have access to local data
that could be used to train the model. Rather, Ci simply
generates Gi,j using the available knowledge (e.g., global
model architecture, matrix values of each received global
model), with a goal of fooling the parameter server, in order
to enjoy the benefits of participating in global model training.
We use Cfi to denote that a client Ci is a free rider.
b) Assumptions.: We restrain our problem as: if a client
is a free-rider, it will be a free rider in all rounds, rather
than being free-riders in some rounds while not in others. The
intuition is that if a client has no local data, it cannot train a
real model in any round. Also, free riders are independent that
they can’t collude to evade detection. We further assume that
the parameter server does not keep a history of local clients
updates. With this, to detect if a client is a free rider in round
j, one can only use the updates available at round i, e.g., [C1,j ,
C2,j , C3,j , ...], without having access to the history.
c) Detection goals.: In this problem, there are multiple
series of local gradient updates, e.g., [G1,1, G1,2, ..., G1,t],
[G2,1, G2,2, ..., G2,t], ..., [Gn,1, Gn,2, ..., Gn,t], and a series
of global models [M1, M2, ..., Mt]. The goal of free-rider
detection is to detect gradient series [Gi,1, Gi,2, ..., Gi,t],
where all gradients Gi,j are faked instead of being updated
through local data.
IV. ATTACK I: RANDOM WEIGHTS
In this section, we present a basic attack that a naive attacker
may exploit, and a possible detection mechanism for this
attack.
A. Attack specification
For the federated learning process, in the j-th round, a free-
rider client Cfi receives the newest global model Mj . The
gradient update Gi,j to submit should have the same dimen-
sion with global model Mj , otherwise would be rejected by
the parameter server immediately. A straightforward method
to construct Gi,j , is to simply copy Mj as Gi,j , and replace
each value in Gi,j with 0, which however, would be trivial to
detect. A better way is to replace each value in Gi,j with a
randomly generated value, which we detail below.
a) Random weights attack.: For this attack, a free rider
will attempt to construct a gradient update matrix that has
the same dimension with the received global model, through
randomly sampling each value from a uniform distribution
within range [−R,R]. The attacker may have previous model
training experience such that R is close to mimic other normal
clients’ updates. For this attack, the attacker may only vary one
parameter, which is listed as below.
Random weights range R. This parameter decides the
maximum and minimum range that a free rider may draw
a random value from. Since an attacker may have previous
model training experience, we may assume this range could
be arbitrarily close to the real case.
B. Defense strategy
Our defense strategy in this section would also focus on
existing anomaly detection methods that a parameter server
may explore. Firstly, we show that this naively generated attack
is possible to evade probably the most popular deep learn-
ing based outlier detection approach - Autoencoder anomaly
detection. Secondly, we show that a recent work dedicated
for high-dimensional anomaly detection called DAGMM, as
presented in Section II-B, is able to detect such attacks.
a) Autoencoder detection.: Autoencoder [12], [13] is a
deep neural network model architecture that has been widely
adopted for outlier detection [15], [16]. It contains an encoder
which aims to reduce the input data dimension, and a decoder
which attempts to reconstruct the input data. Given a data
sample, the learning objective is to minimize the error between
an input and its corresponding output. Since the dimensionality
reduction inevitably brings information loss, an Autoencoder
model which is trained to minimize the average loss of the
entire training data, is trained to preserve the most common
information. As a result, outliers would have larger input-
output error compared with others, since they may contain
patterns that are not learned by Autoencoder. Therefore, we
could do outlier detection by measuring the reconstruction
error for each data sample. To use Autoencoder for free rider
detection, we first concatenate all rows of a client update
matrix (e.g., having dimension m × n) to be a single vector
(e.g., having dimension 1 × mn). Then, all clients’ update
vectors are fed into Autoencoder in mini-batches, to train the
Autoencoder with a learning objective to minimize the average
reconstruction error for each mini-batch.
b) DAGMM detection.: As introduced in Section II-B,
DAGMM is a recently proposed anomaly detection method
that is particularly useful for high-dimensional data. Note
that deep learning model weight matrices could easily contain
millions of parameters. For a simple 2-layer fully connected
network we use for MNIST digit classification, the parameter
size is close to 0.2 million. Thus, we believe DAGMM could
be a more suitable model for our purpose due to the high
dimensional nature of weight matrices. To use DAGMM for
free rider detection, we do the same thing for each client
updates as for Autoencoder - concatenate all rows in a weight
matrix to construct one single vector, and then feed all client
update vectors into the DAGMM model in mini-batches.
... ...
Compression Net Estimation Net
Fig. 1: DAGMM model architecture
C. Experimental validation
Without loss of generality, we assume there are 100 clients
in total, and only 1 free rider among all clients. Extension
on more free riders will be presented in Section VII-A. In
this set of experiments, we use MNIST dataset [17], and
explore two cases in terms of whether each client has similar
data distribution. Note that the clients having similar data are
expected to have similar gradient updates as well. In this case,
the free rider could be easier to detect since the randomly
constructed weight matrix is different from the majority. On
the other hand, if each client may have different data with
others, a free-rider could be harder to detect, since all other
clients may have different gradient updates after training on
local data.
We explore both cases in terms of different R for the random
selection range [−R,R]. Also, note that the performance of the
detection method is highly dependent on the training period,
i.e., a free rider is easier to be detected when the model
is (close to) converged, than at the beginning of a training
period. Although early detection is preferred, we also show
the detection performance when model is close to converged,
as an additional reference.
1) Each client has similar local data distribution.: To
mimic the case where each client has similar local data
distribution with others, we randomly distribute the MNIST
dataset to each client. Therefore, we can assume that each
client possesses all 10 classes in MNIST, and different clients
have similar local datasets. As explained in Section IV-A,
an attacker may have previous training knowledge to choose
range R, to make the constructed weights close to other
clients’ gradient updates.
a) Random weights range R = 10−4.: We first consider
a case where R is not properly selected. In this experiment,
for the gradient updates Gi,j submitted by C
f
i , each value
is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution within range
[−10−4, 10−4]. Figure 2a shows the standard deviation (STD)
of each client’s local gradient updates, with the increase of
rounds in federated learning. The thicker, black line indicates
the STD of the free rider, while lighter lines having various
other colors indicate all other 99 clients’ STD statistics. We
pick two rounds for free rider detection: round 5 which
represents the beginning of federated learning process, and
round 80 which represents the case when the model is almost
converged, which are indicated in Figure 2a as two vertical
dashed lines.
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Fig. 2: Similar local data distribution, randomly sampled
updates from [−10−4, 10−4]
Figure 2d shows the free rider detection result using Au-
toencoder. Presumably, Autoencoder should be able to learn
some important features from the similar weights submitted
by benign clients and thus, produce a higher reconstruction
error for the free rider. However, surprisingly, as in Figure 2d,
Autoencoder has the smallest error for the free rider among
all clients, and thus fails to detect such attack. Based on the
statistics in Figure 2a, our assumption is that the free rider
update has much smaller standard deviation compared with
other clients’ updates, which could be easier to memorize for
Autoencoder, producing a small reconstruction error.
On the other hand, DAGMM is able to detect such attack,
as shown in Figure 2g. Besides the reason that DAGMM
considers the reduced dimensional embeddings, we think that
the Consine distance DAGMM takes into account also helps
to identify free riders, since its input-output angle could be
different from those of normal clients. After DAGMM, the
free rider has the highest energy value, and a wide range
of thresholds suffice to separate the free rider from all other
clients.
b) Random weights range R = 10−3.: In this part, we
explore the case where range R is carefully selected such that
the STD statistics for the free rider is similar to that of all
other clients. In this experiment, for the gradient updates Gi,j
submitted by Cfi , each value is randomly sampled from a
uniform distribution within range [−10−3, 10−3]. The STD
statistics for all clients with the increase of learning rounds are
shown in Figure 3a. Note that the STD of the free rider and
other clients are basically inseparable after round 10. However,
our experimental results (in Figure 3d) suggest that DAGMM
is still able to detect the free rider, both at the beginning
training period (round 5), and when close to converge (round
80).
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Fig. 3: Similar local data distribution, randomly sampled
updates from [−10−3, 10−3]
2) Each client has different local data distribution.: To
simulate the case where each client may have different local
data with others, we first sort the MNIST dataset based on
the labels each image has (i.e., from class 0 to class 9), and
then sequentially distribute the sorted dataset to all clients.
As a result, a majority number of clients only have one class
of MNIST data images locally (e.g., only have images with
number 9), and the rest have up to two classes. In this case,
the free rider could be harder to detect by analyzing submitted
gradient updates, because all other clients’ updates are also
different with each other. As previous section has indicated
that R = 10−3 generates a random update matrix that has
similar STD with other clients, in this section we only show
the results in this case.
a) Random weights range R = 10−3.: The STD statis-
tics of each client’s updates are presented in Figure 4a. Note
here the model accuracy increases slower, and the STD for
each client’s gradient update is also bigger, which are all due
to the different local data distribution on each client.
We demonstrate that DAGMM is still able to successfully
detect such attacks, as shown in Figure 4d.
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Fig. 4: Different local data distribution, randomly sampled
updates from [−10−3, 10−3]
V. ATTACK II: DELTA WEIGHTS
A. Attack specification
As presented in Section II-A, in the j-th round of federated
learning, a client Ci receives the global model Mj and submits
a local gradient update Gi,j . With a received global model at
each round, a free rider is able to construct more sophisticated
fake gradient updates, than merely generating a random update
matrix that has the same dimension with the global model. In
this section, we consider a sophisticated attacker, which gen-
erates the fake gradient updates by subtracting two previously
received global model. We call such an attack as delta weights
attack.
a) Delta weights attack.: Suppose a free rider receives
global model Mj−1 at round j − 1 and Mj at round j. In
the delta weights attack, the free rider Cfi constructs gradient
updates Gfi,j by
Gfi,j =Mj−1 −Mj = η ·
1
n
n∑
x=1
Gx,j−1 (ref.Equation 1)
(2)
This suggests that the fake gradient update Gfi,j constructed at
a round j, is essentially the average gradient update submitted
by all clients at previous round j − 1, times a scaling factor
η.
Note that for machine learning training, except for the first
few epochs, the parameter change at each round is very small.
As a result, the constructed fake gradients could be very
similar to the ones submitted by other clients, and could most
likely evade any detection mechanism that uses a validation
dataset to detect free riders by checking if utility drop happens.
B. Defense strategy
For this attack, the effectiveness of the defense strategy
could be affected by global learning rate η. In the typical case,
when η = 1, the fake gradient update generated by the free
rider is simply the average of all other clients’ updates in
previous rounds. When η is small, free rider’s fake updates
would be much smaller compared with other clients’ updates.
Interestingly, we find that DAGMM works well when η is
close to 1, but fails to detect the free rider when η is small.
Another observation is that, when η is small, the STD statistics
of the fake gradients is also much smaller than other clients’
updates. The detailed results will be presented in the following
experiment section. Based on the two observations, we propose
a general free-rider detection approach that combines both
STD and DAGMM, aiming to provide a general free rider
detection mechanism that works under different learning rates
η. We refer this method as STD-DAGMM detection.
a) STD-DAGMM detection.: In Section II-B, we have
demonstrated that for DAGMM, the input vector of the
estimation net concatenates both the reduced dimensional
embedding vector in Autoencoder, and the distance metrics
(e.g., Euclidean and Cosine distances) between Autoencoder
input and output. To add STD metric into DAGMM network,
we could append this metric into the input vector of estimation
net. We refer this new approach as STD-DAGMM, as shown in
Figure 5. Specifically, given a gradient update matrix, we first
concatenate all rows in the matrix to create a one-dimensional
vector as described in Section IV-B, and then feed it into the
Autoencoder (compression network) of STD-DAGMM. We
then calculate the standard deviation (STD) zstd of this one-
dimensional input vector, as well as the Euclidean and Cosine
distance metrics as discussed in Section IV-B, and further stack
the 3 metrics to create a vector zr of size 3. Finally, this vector
zr is concatenated with the low-dimensional representation zc
learned by Autoencoder (compression network). The output
concatenated vector z is fed into the estimation network for
multivariate Gaussian estimation.
The learning objective for STD-DAGMM is the same as
DAGMM, which is to simultaneously minimize Autoencoder
... ...
Compression Net Estimation Net
Fig. 5: STD-DAGMM model architecture
reconstruction error to better preserve the important feature of
input samples, and maximize the likelihood of observing input
samples.
We find that STD-DAGMM is extremely effective towards
free rider detection, even for very sophisticated attacks which
show no clear separation boundary between basic statistics
of fake and true gradient updates, as will be presented in
Section VI.
C. Experimental validation
As in previous section, for this set of experiments, we
consider a total of 100 clients and only 1 free rider. Remember
that this attack is simply constructed by subtracting two
previous global models. If there are multiple attackers doing
such attack, these free riders will be trivial to detect as they
all submit the same update matrix.
Similar to Section IV-C, we adopt MNIST dataset and a
2-layer fully connected deep neural network, and present our
results under two cases, in terms of whether each client has
similar local data distribution.
1) Each client has similar local data distribution.: In this
section, we demonstrate how previously proposed detection
mechanism may fail, and show the effectiveness of our pro-
posed STD-DAGMM method under various learning rates η.
We find that when the global learning rate η is small
(less than 0.3), DAGMM fails to detect the free rider at the
beginning of the training period (e.g., round 5). This could
happen because: 1) with a low global learning rate η, the
gradient update a free rider constructs is also degraded by η,
which is closer to 0 and easier for the network to memorize;
and 2) compared with Figure 2a, the weight submitted by free
riders and benign clients have similar directions, which makes
the Consine distance metric in DAGMM not work. However,
we observe that when DAGMM fails, the STD of the free
rider gradient updates is much smaller than those of other
clients, due to the scaling factor η. This inspires us to add the
STD metric into DAGMM network, referred as STD-DAGMM
detection approach. The detection result of this method is
shown in Figure 6g. The free rider has an energy value much
larger than other clients, and thus could be easily detected by
a wide range of thresholds.
Based on the statistics in Figure 6a, one may think that the
STD metric itself could be a suitable indicator for free rider
detection. However, we show that it is not enough. Specifically,
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Fig. 6: Similar local data distribution, delta weights attack with
η = 0.3
we demonstrate the results when η = 1 in Figure 7. Note
in Figure 7a, before round 10, the STD curve of free rider
fake updates mostly overlaps with other clients. Hence, using
STD metric is not able to separate the free rider from others.
However, DAGMM is effective in this case with its ability
to capture high-dimensional patterns, as shown in Figure 7d.
Since the proposed STD-DAGMM method combines STD and
DAGMM, it also suffices to detect the free rider in this case, as
in Figure 7g. Hence, we believe the proposed STD-DAGMM
method is a general technique that is able to detect the free
rider utilizing delta weights attack, under different learning
rates η.
To further validate the generality of our proposed STD-
DAGMM approach, we further show its effectiveness under
multiple other learning rates, i.e., η = 0.7 as shown in Fig-
ure 8, and η = 0.9 as in Figure 9. Both results demonstrate that
STD-DAGMM is a general approach for free rider detection
with delta weights generation under different global learning
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Fig. 7: Similar local data distribution, delta weights attack with
η = 1
rates η.
2) Each client has different local data distribution.: In this
section, we distribute MNIST dataset into each local client,
such that each client only has 1 or 2 classes, using the
method described in Section IV-C2. Without loss of generality,
we show the statistics and detection results when η = 1,
as in Figure 10. Note that the STD statistics in Figure 10a
show that the free rider fake updates in this case have lower
standard deviation compared with other clients. We think
that is because all other clients only have a specific set of
parameters to update, thus the submitted gradient vector is
sparse and has larger STD, while the free rider, by averaging
all others’ updates, reduces the STD. Figure 10d indicates that
our proposed STD-DAGMM method is also effective.
3) STD-DAGMM for random weights attack detection:
Finally, we apply STD-DAGMM method on previously eval-
uated random weights attack generation. The results in Fig-
ure 11 show that STD-DAGMM is able to detect the random
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Fig. 10: Different local data distribution, delta weights attack
with η = 1
weights attack evaluated in Section IV-C no matter whether
clients have similar local data or not, which further demon-
strates its generality in free-rider attack detection.
VI. ATTACK III: ADVANCED DELTA WEIGHTS
A. Attack specification
In this section, we further explore a more advanced attack a
free rider may exploit, which is to add Gaussian noise onto the
fake update matrix generated by delta weights attack presented
in Section V. A free rider may benefit from the Gaussian noise
addition in the following two ways. First, we have mentioned
in Section V-C that if multiple free riders all take the delta
weights generation approach, the detection would be trivial
since all such free riders have exactly the same weights. As
a result, a smart attacker may attempt to avoid this by adding
random Gaussian noise onto its generated delta weights.
Second, note that in previous section, we have demonstrated
that having lower STD than others is one important reason
leading to the detection of the free rider. Therefore, a free rider
may try to avoid detection by adding Gaussian noise with zero
mean and a certain STD, such that the resulted gradient update
matrix has similar STD with other clients.
a) Advanced delta weights attack.: Following delta
weights generation in Section V, the advanced delta weights
attack takes a further step by adding Gaussian noise having
mean 0 and standard deviation σ to the delta weights. Specif-
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Fig. 11: Similar local data distribution, random weights attack
ically, a fake gradient update is generated by
Gfi,j = η ·
1
n
n∑
x=1
Gx,j−1 +N(0, σ) (ref.Equation 2) (3)
B. Defense strategy
We find that our proposed STD-DAGMM approach contin-
uously works well for this kind of attack.
C. Experimental validation
Intuitively, the effectiveness of the free rider detection
method would be affected by the choice of σ a free rider
may choose. Although it’s hard to guess the standard deviation
of other normal clients’ gradient updates at each round, we
assume that a strong attacker has previous knowledge of the
training process so that he can submit weights with STD
similar to benign clients’ weights in most of the rounds. In our
experiments, we tried different standard deviation for Gaussian
noise, and find that σ = 10−3 is among the best choices for
the free rider. Specifically, as shown in Figure 12a, adding a
Gaussian noise N(0, 10−3) to the delta weights of two previous
global models will result in a fake gradient update having
similar STD with other clients. Moreover, we show that this
attack indeed makes the free rider harder to be detected, as
in Figure 12d. For DAGMM method, the energy value of
the free rider is completely hidden among normal clients,
for both round 5 and round 80. Nevertheless, our proposed
STD-DAGMM method is still effective in detecting this type
of advanced delta attack, as shown in Figure 12g, where the
energy value for free rider is the biggest, and a wide range of
threshold values suffice to separate the free rider from other
clients.
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attach with σ = 10−3
VII. EXTENSION
In this section, we present some real-world settings and
discuss how our proposed defense strategy would work under
each setting. In reality, many factors may affect the proposed
attack and defense mechanisms. For example, the number of
free riders in the federated learning participants is unknown
to the parameter server. It would be interesting to explore
how STD-DAGMM method would work with more free
riders present. Recently, many privacy enhancing techniques
have been proposed [18], [19], [20], in order to address the
increasing privacy concern in federated learning and machine
learning models in general [21], [22], [23]. These methods
such as differential privacy, which works by applying random
Gaussian noise to the model parameters, would influence the
effectiveness of the proposed attack, and hence the detection
mechanism as well.
A. More free riders
This section explores the effectiveness of our proposed
defense methods, in particular, STD-DAGMM, in the face of
more free riders.
Without loss of generality, we first consider a total of 20 free
riders out of 100 clients, each of which explores the strongest
attack presented earlier - advanced delta weights attack. In
particular, each free rider first calculates a delta weights by
subtracting the global models in two previous rounds, and
adds that with a Gaussian random noise N(0, σ) to make its
standard deviation look similar to other normal clients. For
the MNIST dataset we explore, we find that σ = 10−3 is
among the best choices in Section VI-C, which we adopt
here. As shown in Figure 13a, the black lines are the 20
free riders while the colored lines represent the benign clients.
The higher variation in STD of free riders across the training
rounds are due to the random noise sampled from a Gaussian
distribution. We present the detection results for DAGMM and
STD-DAGMM in Figure 13d and Figure 13g respectively. We
use yellow bars to represent the histogram for free riders and
blue bars for other normal clients. For the bins of energy
values that are duplicated in the figures, we stack free riders’
counts above normal ones. As in the figures, there is no single
threshold that works to separate free riders and normal clients
entirely, either for DAGMM or STD-DAGMM. However, we
can observe that for STD-DAGMM, more free riders have
larger energy values, compared with the ones for DAGMM. To
compare the performance more clearly, we compute the AUC
score, which is the area under the curve that plots the true
positive rate change with the false positive rate, with respect
to different thresholds to separate abnormal/normal samples.
The higher AUC score is, the clearer the separation is, and
the better the detection method. As the numbers shown under
each figure in Figure 13d and Figure 13g, STD-DAGMM
works better than DAGMM for both round 5 (beginning of the
training iteration) and round 80 (end of the training iteration.).
In reality, the defense mechanism wouldn’t know if there
are free riders or how many free riders there are in the
system. Therefore, we further conduct an experiment to test
the effectiveness of STD-GAGMM with varying ratios of free
riders. The AUC scores for DAGMM and STD-DAGMM with
increasing number of free riders are as shown in Figure 14.
As one would imagine, as the ratio of free riders in the
system becomes larger, it becomes more difficult for the
defense mechanism to detect the free riders, validated by the
decreasing curves in Figure 14. Nevertheless, STD-DAGMM
outperforms DAGMM regardless of free rider ratios.
We note that there is still room for improvement in order to
detect all free riders without too many false positives, which
we leave as our future work.
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B. With differential privacy
The concept of differential privacy (DP) was proposed in
[19] and later extended for deep learning in [24] and federated
learning in [18]. In this section, we consider the proposed
DP usage in federated learning setting [18], where each client
clips its local gradient updates with a clipping bound, and the
parameter server adds DP noise to the aggregated model, to
form the new global model. Although the clipping mechanism
each client applies could potentially render local updates not
that different with other clients, we find that for federated
learning, another mechanism called privacy amplification in-
fluences the defense mechanism the most, and could in fact
favor the detection.
The idea of privacy amplification is: in each round, instead
of all clients participating in the training process, each client
chooses whether to join with a ratio q. Remember that the goal
of differential privacy is to hide the participance of each local
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Fig. 14: AUC scores of different detection methods with
varying ratios of free riders, 100 clients in total, similar local
data distribution, advanced delta weights attack with σ = 10−3
client. If some adversary has to guess if a client joins a round
of training, the probability he guesses it right degrades by q
under privacy amplification, which helps privacy. With this, a
free rider will only join the model training every 1/q rounds,
and receive the global model when it’s his turn. If a free rider
were to launch delta weights attack in this case, he could only
subtract two previously received global model weights, and
possibly divide that by the number 1/q, to approximate other
clients’ updates. In this case, the constructed free rider update
by delta weights attack is more different than other clients’
normal submissions, compared with the case where the delta
weights are calculated by subtracting two adjacent previous
rounds’ global models. Thus the delta weights attack is easier
to detect.
For this experiment, we assume there are 20 free riders and
they randomly join a training round with other clients. For
detection, we deliberately skip the first several rounds to make
sure that free riders have accumulated enough knowledge
(two global models) to generate a delta weight update. We
perform the detection at round 20, 40, 60, and 80 respectively,
Figure 15a shows that the STD of free riders (marked as
crosses) are much higher than that of normal clients (marked
as dots), and thus should be easier to be detected. Since free
riders’ updates are an aggregation of small gradient updates
during q rounds, it should be larger than benign clients’
gradient updates in magnitude and standard deviation as well.
As shown in Figure 15d and 15g, both DAGMM and STD-
DAGMM are able to detect all free riders.
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VIII. LIMITATION
Currently, MNIST dataset and a two-layer fully-connected
model are used in all of our experiments. Although our attack
and detection methods do not depend on the actual training
data and model architecture, we admit that there are a large
variety of datasets and models that may be used under the
framework of federated learning. We leave it as future work
to exploit the performance of different attack and defense
methods on other datasets and models, e.g., advanced language
models on natural language datasets. Moreover, recent papers
have proposed new paradigms for federated learning, for
example, secure aggregation, which may affect the attack
and defense strategies proposed here. For example, in secure
aggregation where the central parameter server cannot see the
updated matrices of the clients in plain texts, free rider attack
detection could be challenging. More research work could be
done targeting different federated learning solutions.
IX. RELATED WORK
Since proposed in [1], federated learning has attracted many
research to make it more practical and more robust in real
world usages. Some of the schemes proposed for federated
learning could potentially affect a free rider’s weights genera-
tion strategy, or the effectiveness of the detection mechanism.
There have been many previous work proposed to enhance
federated learning, e.g., to make it more communication
efficient [25], [26], or privacy-preserving [18], [27]. The
communication cost in federated learning could be reduced
by reducing the size of updates, in ways such as cutting down
decimal digits in each value of the model update [25], [26].
This mechanism could potentially cause free riders easier to
deceive since there are fewer digits to manipulate. To address
the privacy concerns [28], [29], client-level differential privacy
[18] is proposed to prevent leaking local clients’ private
data from global model parameters, and a secure aggregation
mechanism is proposed for federated learning in [27]. For
example, if secure aggregation [27] is applied, where the
parameter server is not supposed to view locally submitted
model parameters, advances in cryptographic fields might be
required to address the free rider attack problem.
Although the concept of free rider attack has not been
explored in previous work, there have been related work
on other attacks and defenses targeting federated learning
domain. For starters, [30] proposes a method to defend against
poisoning attacks in federated learning, through clustering the
local clients’ updates and treating the majority as normal.
This detection does not work for the delta weights attack in
our setting because the attacker submitted updates are similar
to those of normal clients. Another type of backdoor attack
is proposed in [31], where the attacker submits constructed
large weights to overwrite the global model’s parameter, such
that it predicts a certain label for some images with special
patterns. They find that client-level DP [32] could degrade
the effectiveness of such attack. Also, we note that our
STD-DAGMM method is potentially effective since an attack
constructed this way would have much larger STD than other
normal clients. Poisoning attacks for federated learning are
further explored in [33], where the adversarial objective is
to cause the model to mis-classify chosen inputs with high
confidence. While no defense mechanisms are presented in
the paper, and it will be interesting to explore whether our
STD-DAGMM method could defend against the proposed
attacks. [34] explores sybil-based label-flipping and backdoor
poisoning attacks in federated learning, and proposes to use
cosine similarity as a detection metric to adjust the weight for
each client update. However, such defense wouldn’t work for
our delta weights attack, since free riders’ gradient updates
would not show a big difference with other clients in terms of
angles in weight updates.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a potential problem in federated
learning, that a client having no local data may construct
a local gradient update, in order for rewards. We study
different attacks an attacker may take, and possible detection
mechanisms against such attacks. In particular, we propose a
novel detection scheme: STD-DAGMM, that is effective in
detecting most of the free riders in most explored settings.
Further, we find that differential privacy, particularly the
privacy amplification mechanism in federated learning, favors
the detection of free riders. For future work, the proposed
STD-DAGMM method shows its effectiveness in anomaly
detection for model weights, so studying its effectiveness in
detecting other attacks for federated learning, e.g., poisoning
attacks, is one interesting direction to pursue. Finally, we note
that there are much more to investigate in the field of free
rider attacks and defenses, especially with constantly proposed
federated learning enhancing strategies. We believe our initial
exploration may shed light on future work in this area.
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